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I. INTRODUCTION
The world today is appallingly interesting. It is interesting, be-
cause it is changing so fast. It is appalling, because almost every
change we have witnessed in the course of the last years has been
a change for the worse. As mankind is ever proceeding from the
past, through the present, toward the future, all change may, in
the purely dynamic sense of the term, be called progress. If, how-
ever, we seek to estimate the value of change in terms of human
welfare, as also if we consider it in the light of the goals pursued,
the most significant recent changes in the political and economic
spheres are clearly reactionary.
For generations, and in some cases for centuries, ail nations
within the orbit of our Western civilization have, through wars and
revolutions, been striving to secure for all their members greater
physical and moral security, greater political equality, greater in-
dividual freedom. Greater security—that is, more assured protec-
tion against the violence of their fellow-citizens and against the
arbitrary oppression of their governments. Greater equality—that
is, less discrimination on grounds of race, of sex, of religious and
philosophical creed and of social position. Greater freedom—that
is, more latitude for the self-expression and self-assertion of the
individual In the face of the authority of tradition and of the state.
Guarantees for the protection of the fundamental rights of man,
the abolition of arrest without trial and of imprisonment for debt,
the suppression of slavery, the extension of the suffrage to all and
thereby the subordination of the government to the will of the peo-
* A paper read before the Geneva Institute of International Relations on August
14, 1933.
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pie (that is, of the majority of all the people), parliamentary con-
trol of the budget (that is, no taxation without representation), the
recognition of freedom of thought, of speech, of assembly, of the
press, the independence of the judiciary and the autonomy of the
university—such are some of the ideals for which our fathers,
grandfathers, and great-grandfathers fought, bled, and died. Such
are some of the conquests of human dignity over barbarism, of
knowledge over ignorance, of right over might, which they tri-
umphantly achieved and which they proudly bequeathed to us.
And such are some of the ideals which, after the greatest struggle
in human history, we their children of the twentieth century,
through stupidity and cowardice are, sometimes with the blind en-
thusiasm of mad fanaticism and sometimes with the dull resig-
nation of impotence, disavowing, renouncing, abandoning. The
individual, the family, the local or regional community, every-
thing and everybody, is being sacrificed to the state. The state
itself, once held to be the protector and the servant of the people,
is in several countries of our Western civilization being turned into
a weapon for oppressing its own citizens and threatening its neigh-
bors, according to the capricious will of one or of a few self-
appointed individuals. These individuals, whether they style
themselves chiefs, leaders, or dictators, are all what free men of all
times, in all climes, have combatted as tyrants. They are today
acclaimed as heroes by hundreds of thousands of European youths,
welcomed as saviors by millions of European bourgeois, and ac-
cepted as inevitable by tens of millions of European senile cowards
of all ages.
If, as I expect to occur, I am accused of exaggeration, I beg my
critics to take a sketch map of the world. Let them mark in black
the areas subjected to regimes such as I have indicated and leave
in white those which are governed in conformity with the ideals of
freedom that inspired the British, American, and French revolu-
tions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I accept their
judgment as to the present state of the world, and particularly of
Europe.
Is it surprising, under these circumstances, that the League of
Nations, which some of its founders wished to call the League of
Free Nations, should be undergoing a crisis so severe as to menace
its very existence? The League of Nations is an attempt to realize,
on the international plane, the ideals of government which its
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NATIONALISM AND THE LEAGUE OP NATIONS TODAT 723
founders rejoiced in within their own respective countries. Human
freedom, guaranteed by the organized community against the ag-
gression and the oppression of the violent few; human welfare,
promoted by the spontaneous and orderly cooperation of all for the
benefit of all—such were the national ideals which President Wil-
son, Lord Robert Cecil, General Smuts, L6on Bourgeois formulated
in the Covenant for the benefit of the international community.
As long as this conception of the good life, national and interna-
tional, remains that of a sufficient number of sufficiently convinced
and powerful members of the League, so long will the League en-
dure. But only when it becomes that of the overwhelming majority
of the human race and is recognized and proclaimed as such by
their governments can the League truly prosper.
Students of the League of Nations in 1933 should realize to the
full its present plight and seek to understand the reasons thereof.
Especially is this true of those who study the League not merely
with a desire to satisfy their own scientific curiosity, but also with
the will to contribute to the success of its endeavors and to the
triumph of its ideals. Official optimism, always a nauseous dish for
the mind of the honest, if it could perhaps in prosperous times be
excused as a useful stimulant for the will of the feeble, would today
act as a sickening and deadly opiate on the minds and wills of all.
Not only the friends of truth, but especially also the real friends
of the League, should therefore today, meeting at its bedside, take
full cognizance of the gravity of the patient's condition and inquire
into the true nature and causes of its illness in order to be in a posi-
tion to determine and to recommend the necessary remedies.
That the League is ill will doubtless escape the attention of no
observer, no matter how casual, how superficial, or how blindly
optimistic. To be sure, the new buildings are progressing, or—to
avoid that ambiguous term—being completed. To be sure, com-
mittees and subcommittees are continuing to meet, interpreters to
interpret, prids writers to draft minutes, officials to produce in-
telligent memoranda, and delegates to deliver lengthy speeches.
To be sure, the states members of the League are continuing to pay
their contributions, although somewhat less promptly and fully,
and to send representatives to Geneva, although perhaps not as
many nor as influential representatives as some years ago. To be
sure, most of the political, administrative, and technical activities
are being carried on, and some are achieving results truly useful for
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724 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
the states themselves and for their mutual relations. To be sure,
finally, the main conferences summoned by the League have never
been attended by so many official delegations, and the cooperation
of non-member states, particularly the United States and Soviet
Russia, has never been as continuous, as intimate, and—one would
like to be able to add with more confidence—as fruitful.
I would be the last to underestimate the real importance of all
the work done by the League and its servants and, thanks to the
League, by the states themselves, their governments, and their
delegates. The very existence of the Covenant, even if its provisions
are sometimes violated, and the very existence of the League, even
if its recommendations are often disregarded, are politically valu-
able, as is morally valuable the conscience of the most inveterate
sinner. They offer an occasion for international discussion which,
even when it leads to no positive results in the form of agreements,
does most helpfully contribute to mutual understanding. The ease
with which such discussions are initiated and the atmosphere of
orderly freedom and impartiality in which they are pursued are
gains which the world owes the League, and which enlightened and
unbiased pre-war statesmen and students never tire of emphasizing
in the light of their own less fortunate recollections. Furthermore,
besides this advantage which a knowledge of the past brings to our
attention, there is another perhaps still more significant advantage
which the future may reveal. The Covenant and the League, by
their very existence, continuously offer the world the opportunity
of constructive alternative policies to those which, in spite of the
Covenant and of the League, are so generally and so disastrously
being pursued today. When contemporary statesmanship shall
have exhausted the cruelly disappointing possibilities of the exclu-
sive nationalism to which it is condemning the world, it may well
revert to the Covenant and find therein both consolations and
exhortations similar to those which the surviving politicians of the
Southern Confederacy, after the Civil War, doubtless found in
President Lincoln's speeches and messages.
That the world is better off today for the League of Nations is
obvious to my mind. But that the League of Nations is very badly
off in a world disloyal to its Covenant and indifferent to its prom-
ises, strikes me as no less obvious. It is to a brief attempted diag-
nosis of the League's illness that the remainder of this paper will be
devoted.
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NATIONALISM AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TODAY 725
Besides, and overshadowing, its many varied activities, to which
allusion has already been made and whose importance has already
been recognized, the League has, in the course of the last year, been
engaged in three major enterprises: the attempted peaceful settle-
ment of the Sino-Japanese dispute by the Council and the Special
Assembly; the attempted reduction and limitation of national
armaments by the so-called Disarmament Conference; and the
attempted world economic reconstruction by the Monetary and
Economic Conference. Three major attempts, three major failures.
It is now my unpleasant but necessary task to show briefly, but
quite ruthlessly, that, how, and why these attempts were failures.
I find no better analogy to evoke than that of the dental surgeon
and of his equally unpleasant, necessary, and ruthless task. A very
discreet allusion, I hope, will suffice, when I say that no tooth is
ever well filled unless the decayed cavity be completely cleared
of all soft matter, regardless of the momentary comfort of the
patient, and even of the life of some of his nerves!
II. THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT
Of the three failures of the League about which I have now to
report, that of the settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict is per-
haps the most serious in itself and the most far-reaching in its
repercussions, as it is certainly the most spectacular.
It was a failure, first, because it led to an open breach of the
Covenant, as well as of at least two other international treaties, by
a state permanently represented on the Council. That the attitude
of Japan toward China in Manchuria and in Shanghai and toward
the League in Geneva was an example of the "open, just, and honor-
able relations between nations" which the signatories of the Cove-
nant prescribed for themselves in its Preamble; that Japan dis-
played the will to make "of the understandings of international
law" "the actual rule of" its "conduct among governments;" that
her policy was characterized by the desire to maintain "justice and
a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of or-
ganized peoples with one another"—all this cannot honestly be
asserted. The undoubted and much-stressed fact that the Chinese
of today cannot be described as an "organized people" does cer-
tainly not relieve Japan of its international obligations toward
China; nor would any responsible Japanese statesman before the
outbreak of 1931 have claimed that it did so.
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726 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
That Japan has since that date respected and preserved "as
against external aggression the territorial integrity" of China, as
she was bound to do under Article 10, cannot seriously be held by
anyone. That the conflict was examined by the Council and by
the Assembly at the request of China, that after much hesitation,
delay, negotiation, and inquiry, the Assembly rendered the report
called for under the provisions of Article 15, and that that report
was "unanimously agreed to by the members . . . other than the
representatives of one . . . of the parties to the dispute," are mat-
ters of common knowledge. That China accepted the report and
complied with its recommendations, and that Japan was therefore
legally debarred, under Article 15, paragraph 6, from "going to war"
with her cannot be denied. In order therefore to free Japan, who
pursued her aggression after the verdict of the Assembly, of the
accusation of having violated her undertakings on this point, one
has to claim that the continuance of the use of organized military
force against complying China is not synonymous with "going to
war." When a case can be made to rest on no better arguments
than on such verbal quibbles, it is assuredly desperate.
Japan has openly broken her international pledgeo by initiating,
pursuing, and bringing to a successful close an aggression against
one of her neighbors, like her a member of the League, and by
wantonly disregarding all contrary provisions of the Covenant.
Her decision to leave a League of Nations so contrary in its funda-
mental principles and in the unanimous views of its so different
members to the present temper of her government, is a tacit ad-
mission of the fact, if further proof were necessary.
For this first reason alone, the Sino-Japanese conflict has been a
misfortune for the League. To have lost, morally through her fel-
ony, and materially through her resignation, a charter member,
is for the structure of an already weak League a very serious blow.
This, however, is not in my estimation the graveot aspect of the
matter. The League was created to maintain peace, if need be
among its own members. That one or several of them might resort
to war in disregard of their pledges was foreseen and provided for
by its founders. One may even say that the League would forfeit
most of its justification if such an event could be dismissed as being
without the realm of practical politics. That Japan has violated the
Covenant is in every sense deplorable. But so far we have noted no
fact that has humbled the League or shaken its authority.
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NATIONALISM AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TODAT 727
The second and much more serious aspect of the dispute from
the point of view of the League is that Japan violated the Covenant
not only, as we have seen, with defiance, but also with complete
impunity, and therefore, as far as one can judge historical events
which have not yet run their full course, with complete success.
Thereby she has dealt a crushing blow not merely to the structure
of the League, but to its prestige and to its raison d'itre in the eyes
of the world. The machinery expressly set up under the Covenant
for the maintenance of peace and the protection of the law-abiding
has failed lamentably to function, or—what is perhaps more ac-
curate but hardly more hopeful—it has functioned only verbally
and not actually. Like a motor in action, disconnected from the
car which it was intended to drive, the machinery of the League
has been turning for nearly two years. But it has, amidst the pro-
tests, denunciations, complaints, and imprecations of its engineers,
left stranded by the roadside the chariot of peace and justice which
it was intended to propel on a course of triumphant achievement.
This failure is equally grave in its immediate cause and in its
direct and indirect consequences. Its immediate cause is to be
found in what may brutally but not inaccurately be called the dis-
loyalty to the League of all the member states. As we have seen,
in effect and in spite of all the legalistic subtleties which have been
produced to disguise the fact, Japan resorted to war in disregard
of her covenants against a state which had accepted the unanimous
decision of the other members of the League. This very case is pro-
vided for under the Covenant by Article 16, the first three para-
graphs of which have no other purpose than to organize the pro-
tection of the victim of unjustified aggression. Just because, for the
reasons I am deploring, those provisions were hushed out of ex-
istence in the final stages of the Sino-Japanese discussion in Geneva,
they shall be quoted in extenso here. They read as follows:
1. Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its
covenants under Articles 12,13, or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have
committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which
hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade
or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their na-
tionals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state, and the preven-
tion of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the
nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other
state, whether a member of the League or not.
2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the
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several governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force
the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces
to be used to protect the covenants of the League.
3. The members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually
support one another in the financial and economic measures which are
taken under this article, in orderto minimize the loss and inconvenience
resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support
one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their num-
ber by the covenant-breaking state, and that they will take the necessary
steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the
members of the League which are cooperating to protect the covenants of
the League.
Japan, as we have seen, violated her covenants not to resort to
war. But who, after examining carefully and frankly the situation
in the light of the just quoted clauses, can in all intellectual honesty
deny that Japan's example was followed by her fellow-members?
Under paragraph 1 of Article 16, they undertook to apply certain
specific sanctions to the covenant-breaking state, but in fact there
has, on their part, been no "severance of all trade or financial rela-
tions," no "prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals
and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state," no "prevention
of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the
nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any
other state." And there has, of course, been no consideration by
the Council, in pursuance of what would have been its duty under
paragraph 2, of the "effective military, naval, or air force the mem-
bers of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces
to be used to protect the covenants of the League."
On the contrary, far from being isolated and outlawed, as the
Covenant—to say nothing of the Kellogg Pact—provides, Japan
is being treated by her associates in the League with all the consid-
eration due to an equal and powerful accomplice. Thus the failure
of the international community to live up to its duties of self-
protection in the person of each of its members, which is the im-
mediate cause of the inefficacy of the peace machinery in the case
of the Sino-Japanese dispute, has been a third factor of the League's
weakness.
A fourth is to be found in the consequences of this collapse. By
failing to protect China, the League has disappointed not only the
Chinese victims of its impotence, but its other friends and support-
ers all over the world. By forfeiting their confidence in its ability
to meet the emergencies it was essentially created to meet, it has
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NATIONALISM AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TODAY 729
rendered immeasurably more difficult propaganda in its favor.
When one realizes the importance of public opinion in international
affairs, that loss which, in its turn, entails a diminution of the
League's vitality, seems almost irreparable. Not the man in the
street alone, but also all thoughtful and responsible statesmen, are
tempted to conclude from the League's paralysis in the Sino-
Japanese dispute that it can under no circumstances be looked to
as a protector of the victims of any aggression that may take place
in future. This view, which is very widely held, and has even been
openly expressed in official League circles, is the major cause of the
League's second failure, in the sphere of disarmament.
Before turning to that, we must seek to discover, behind the
outstanding facts just recalled, the deeper causes of the League's
impotence in the Sino-Japanese dispute. These causes, which I will
state with the same frankness shown in describing their effects,
explain and thereby to some extent may excuse the failings of the
League.
The first of these causes I see in the deplorably disorganized
state of China. When a country is palpably unable to govern itself,
when even under the stress of foreign invasion its rival govern-
ments, generals, and armies cannot sink their differences in a com-
mon effort of national defense, when its principal leaders are so
uncertain of their own policies and so fearful of the consequences of
drastic action that they refrain from breaking off their diplomatic
relations with the aggressor against whom they claim the protection
of the rest of the world, then surely there is some excuse for the rest
of the world if it is reluctant to engage its last resources in an at-
tempt to secure that purpose.
A most unsatisfactory customer for the League China is, not
only by reason of its internal state, but also by reason of its ge-
ographical position. It so happens—and friends of the League like
to think that it is no mere accident—that Japan's victim is placed
between two other great Powers, neither of which is a member of
the League. Without the cooperation both of Soviet Russia on
land and of the United States on the sea, it is difficult to conceive
of a possible military action in favor of China against Japan. And
without the cooperation of either, it is clearly impossible. Now, not
only the military, but even the economic, cooperation of the United
States and of the Soviet Republic was unavailable in Geneva. It
was, in fact, so obviously unavailable that it was not even sought.
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730 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
It is uncertain whether it would really have been welcomed in the
leading capitals of Europe, even if it had been available. But who
doubts that Japan's aggressive action was materially facilitated by
the absence from the Council and the Assembly of the representa-
tives of the Soviets, and that it was not substantially impeded by
the intermittent and almost casual appearance of American ob-
servers?
These two circumstances alone might have explained the in-
ability of the League to bring about a fair and peaceful settlement
of the Sino-Japanese dispute. For neither of them could the League
nor any of its leading members be made responsible. Had there
been no other impediments, the lesson taught by the events would
have been simple, or rather, if one may use the phrase, simply
double. On the one hand, China would have been reminded once
again of the wisdom of the saying concerning heaven's helping only
those who help themselves. On the other hand, the League would
once more have been made to realize the advantages, nay the ne-
cessity, of its becoming universal in membership.
But although the Sino-Japanese conflict has undoubtedly re-
vealed these two impediments and brought home these two lessons,
it would be a most superficial analysis that discovered no other
obstacles and pointed to no other conclusions. No careful observer
of the events, in Geneva, in London, in Paris, in Tokyo, in Nan-
king, and elsewhere, could fail to note that inhibitions of another
order were also paralyzing the League.
On Great Britain, as the leading naval power, as the mistress
of Hongkong, as the head of an empire including Australia, India,
New Zealand, and Canada, and as the most important Western
trader and financier in the Far East, rested the main burden of
responsibility in the Council and in the Assembly. At no time had
one the impression that British policy was determined essentially
by the will to uphold the Covenant and to protect China. No
British ship was moved. No word of direct and unequivocal warn-
ing was uttered. No consistent and persistent effort was made to
enlist American and Russian cooperation. The British ambassador
in Tokyo was reported as being not at all hostile to the action of
Japan. Considerations relating to the security of British possessions
and British dominions and the promotion of immediate British
economic and political interests were always paramount. In Lon-
don, Japan seemed throughout to enjoy real popularity. When the
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Foreign Secretary declared that under no circumstances would his
government allow Great Britain to be brought into conflict with
her former ally in the Far East, his statement was well received in
the House and in the press.
Nor was the attitude of France fundamentally different. Mindful
of the position of Indo-China in Asia, and far from indifferent to
Japanese diplomatic support in Europe, particularly at the Dis-
armament Conference, her conception of the League as the essen-
tial guarantor of security and as the supreme supporter and en-
forcer of treaties seemed strangely limited to her own continent.
Italy, whose r61e was modest, could not be expected boldly to op-
pose the policy of Japanese imperialism based on notions of racial
superiority and of demographic expansion very familiar and very
dear to her present chief. Germany, with so many irons in the fire
on her own borders, did not dream of offending the Great Power of
the Far East in the interests of prostrate China. As, in spite of her
anarchy, China was an appreciable present market and a potentially
important future market, no one openly abandoned her. But as
Japan, with all her burden of international sins, was a still more
active customer and a more formidable factor on the political
chessboard, the attitude of the Great Powers of the League toward
Tokyo was more that of outwardly aggrieved but really benevolent
neutrality than that of stern and vigilant justice.
It was left to the minor states, and especially to Spain, Ireland,
and Czechoslovakia, to uphold the principles of the Covenant.
This they did with genuine energy, but of course with little risk to
themselves, as with no decisive influence on the course of events in
the Far East.
The sad but obvious fact was, and is, that all of the leading
states were, and are, more or less openly subordinating to their
immediate national interests their duties to the Covenant, to the
League, and to the cause of world security and international jus-
tice. In this respect, the Sino-Japanese conflict has evidenced with
more dazzling clarity than any other event the supremacy of cen-
trifugal, national forces over the centripetal, world tendencies in
our present civilization. Ever since the founding of the League, this
supremacy has been the main obstacle to its progress; it, alas, may
still prove its final undoing.
One could find a fourth, less tangible but perhaps not less funda-
mental, cause of the League's impotence in the general realization
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of the unsatisfactory nature of the Covenant as at present inter-
preted as a means for peacefully bringing about necessary changes
in international law. It is impossible here to go into the details of
Sino-Japanese relations. They are lucidly summed up in the Lytton
Report. But no reader of that remarkable document, which has
done more than any other single factor to save the League's honor
in all this dismal affair, can deny that Japan has a case against
China. According to all historical precedent, and also to a natural
sense of historical justice, Japan, by reason of the nature and den-
sity of her population and by reason of her political and adminis-
trative superiority, cannot indefinitely be held in check by the
whole world. Unless and until the League devises some legal means
of authorizing, regulating, and controlling normal and inevitable
expansion, it will be exposed to outbursts of violence such as that
of Japan in Manchuria.
As the safest, and in fact the only, means of preventing revolu-
tion nationally is to provide for constitutional methods of consti-
tutional revision, so the prevention of international war impera-
tively demands the institution and effective application of methods
of pacific treaty revision. The drafters of the Covenant, particu-
larly President Wilson, were fully aware of this necessity. But it is
questionable whether Article 19, which bears witness thereto, will
prove a sufficiently elastic safety valve to forestall future explo-
sions. Here also the pacific organization of mankind would seem to
call for a greater measure of subordination of national sovereignty
to the interests, needs, and rights of the world community. All of
these circumstances, I believe, should be taken into account if one
is clearly to understand and fairly to judge the impotence of the
League in the settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict.
III. DISARMAMENT
I come now to what I have called the second major failure of the
League—that in the sphere of disarmament. Am I too pessimistic?
Or at least, is it premature to speak of failure here?
To be sure, the League, which has been dealing with the topic for
thirteen years, and the Conference for the Reduction and Limita-
tion of Armaments, which has been in intermittent session for a
year and a half, are far from admitting the failure. But are failures
ever officially admitted in international affairs?
The unpalatable but indisputable fact is that the states of the
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world are today spending more on their armaments in gold than
they were before the war, and also than they were five years ago.
That, in the present depression, this greater sum represents a
smaller fraction of the world's income will be claimed by no one.
Therefore, frankness obliges us to recognize that the League has
thus far failed to achieve that "reduction of national armaments"
which its members, in Article 8 of the Covenant, have declared to
be necessary for "the maintenance of peace."
It may be argued, and in fact truthfully stated, that the "reduc-
tion of national armaments" contemplated in Article 8 was "to the
lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement
by common action of international obligations." That the present
state of armaments is not above that point may be, and is being,
asserted on the best of impartial authority. That is precisely the
calamity. If national armaments have been and are increasing, and
if they are not today above the level deemed consistent with na-
tional safety, it must be concluded that international security has
been shaken and not consolidated since the drafting of the Cove-
nant. From that conclusion it is unfortunately impossible to escape.
If, as some have always held, and as impartial observers are
more and more unanimously conceding, disarmament cannot be
achieved except as a by-product of the organization of peace and
the consolidation of international solidarity, then it is at least
probable that the failure of the League heretofore effectively to
reduce armaments should be attributed to its failure to organize
peace and to consolidate international solidarity. And so it is, in my
view.
But, it may be objected, surely the efforts of the Disarmament
Conference, the instructive and useful discussions of the French,
American, British, and Soviet proposals, the tentative agreements
already reached concerning the principle of equality, concerning a
permanent Disarmament Commission, concerning qualitative re-
ductions, not to mention the American offers of political cooperation
in emergencies—surely all this is progress. It is progress on the road
toward a fuller appreciation of the real difficulties and of the real
conditions of disarmament. But it will be progress on the road to
disarmament only if and when armaments cease to increase and
begin to be reduced as a result of the overcoming of these difficulties
and of the fulfillment of these conditions.
Today, in so far as Europe is concerned, the essentials of the
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position as they appear to me are briefly the following. The most
pacific nations are relatively the most formidably armed. The least
pacific, or those whose present temper and professed policies are
least compatible with the maintenance of peace, are as yet deprived
of major armaments. Disarmament to a basis of equality between
the two groups of states means therefore the weakening of the
pacific nations and the relative strengthening of their potential
aggressors. In the absence of a League of Nations, or of any other
international organization willing and able to protect the victims
of aggression, one is therefore led to choose between a policy of
disarmament and a policy of peace.
To make myself perfectly clear, I would ask: Is there anyone
within or without Germany who honestly considers the present
German regime to be peaceful in its instincts, in its desires, and in
its intentions today, and who believes that it would be peaceful in
its acts tomorrow if it had the power to go to war with reasonable
hope of success? Certainly the countless Germans with whom I
have spoken in the past months, including several who are far from
hostile to the present regime, are not of that opinion, no more than
the authors of the official speeches one can almost daily hear over
the radio or read in the papers. Now if such is the situation, if
Germany is inhibited from disturbing the peace of Europe solely,
or at least mainly, by the consciousness of her present military in-
feriority, is it the duty of France and her allies, is it their right, to
disarm? Furthermore, is it to the interests of peace that they should
disarm?
Not peace through disarmament, as one would hope and as the
authors of Article 8 of the Covenant expected, is the saving formula
today. But peace or disarmament—such is the tragic dilemma that
faces contemporary Europe. It is all the more tragic since it is ob-
vious that the present unfortunately salutary inequality in arma-
ments offends one's natural sense of justice and cannot subsist
indefinitely. But is it really a dilemma? My answer is: Yes, in the
present anarchical state of international relations. No, in a world
of pacific nations, or, if that be inconceivable, in a world so or-
ganized, so constituted, so federated, that each of its national mem-
bers could rely on the support of the international community as
a whole, or at least of the overwhelming majority of its associates,
if attacked by an aggressive neighbor.
If that is Utopia, then the League of Nations, which is based on
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that fundamental conception of international relations, is Utopia.
"The world is even now upon the eve of a great consummation
when some common force will be brought into existence which shall
safeguard right as the first and most fundamental interest of all
peoples and all governments, when coercion shall be summoned not
to the service of political ambition or selfish hostility, but to the
service of a common order, common justice, and a common peace.
God grant that the dawn of that day of frank dealing and of settled
peace, concord, and cooperation may be near at hand!" These
noble words were uttered, not by an irresponsible dreamer, nor by
the head of a belligerent state as a stimulant for the morale of his
troops on the battlefield, nor by an insincere demagogue bent on
overthrowing the government of his day. They were uttered on
May 27, 1916, by President Woodrow Wilson.
The "great consummation" then heralded has not yet come
about. The "day of frank dealing and of settled peace, concord, and
cooperation" then prayed for has not yet come. To some they seem
even further removed in 1933 than they did in 1916. But the ele-
ments of the disarmament problem are the same today as then.
If you wish disarmament, you must work for the organization
of peace. And if you really wish an effective organization of peace,
you cannot tolerate the perpetuation of the riot of national sov-
ereignties which is maintaining the world in a state of mutual sus-
picion and hostility, and is ever more transforming Europe into an
armed camp.
IV. THE ECONOMIC CONFERENCE
Concerning the third major failure of the League, I shall be very
brief. Not that I can share the reported opinion of the American
Secretary of State, on his return home, to the effect that the World
Economic Conference was "still alive and virile • . . and that
it would eventually achieve success." Of course, "eventually" is a
cautious term. But whether success is to be achieved in the course
of the present year, as the statement seems to imply, or whether
the Conference will be successful only when we shall no longer be
among the living to applaud, there is no doubt that it has so far
dismally failed.
Summoned to combat the depression, primarily by stabilizing
the currencies and reducing the tariffs of the world, after the neces-
sary preliminary solution of the international debt problem, the
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Monetary and Economic Conference has not only failed to bring
about any of the agreements foreshadowed on its agenda; it has ac-
tually left international economic relations in a more distressing
state of uncertainty and confusion than they already were in when
it convened. Nor is that either surprising or unexpected.
Ever since the great upheaval of the war, currencies have been
unstable, tariffs have been rising, and all the states of the world
have been drifting toward more or less openly avowed ideals of
national self-sufficiency. Under the cyclical wave of prosperity
which abruptly broke in the autumn of 1929, these anarchical and
centrifugal tendencies were hidden from the view of the general
public. But they were real, and they seemed inoffensive only to
those who judge economic prosperity by the current rate of wages,
the current price levels, and the current quotations of securities.
How a world which every advance of civilization and every ma-
terial improvement tends to make more interdependent could hope
to achieve lasting prosperity under a political regime which stressed
and strove to realize the ideals of national independence also on the
economic plane, is a mystery. The Economic Conference of 1927,
meeting in the midst of what today seem almost unbelievably good
times, was not blind to the dangers that threatened. Its warnings
and its recommendations alike remained unheeded. The folly of
economic nationalism, although deplored and denounced by nearly
all, continued strangely enough to dictate the policy of nearly all.
The inevitable result is the world as we see it today.
What is surprising is less that millions should be unemployed
everywhere than that mankind should be able to continue to live
without any increase in the death-rate. This is surely due not to
the economic policies of the governments, but to the technical
progress of industrial and agricultural production on the one hand,
and of public hygiene on the other. Progress in these fields has been
such as to enable the world economically to afford the folly of its
nationalism. But, given that nationalism which unfortunately as
yet shows no signs of abating, it was clearly an illusion to hope that
an international conference, even if it had been well prepared by
all the principal delegations, could in a month overcome the de-
pression, or even lay the foundations for a future recovery.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Shall we conclude our consideration of this topic, shall we con-
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elude our whole study, with an admission of the failure of inter-
nationalism? Only those who have followed me inattentively thus
far could expect such a conclusion. Let the nationalists who are
content with the world as it is speak of the failure of international-
ism. Let those who delight in the triumph of might over right, as
exemplified in the Sino-Japanese dispute, let those who rejoice in
the ever-increasing burden and threat of national armaments, let
those who revel in the sight of abandoned farms, of empty work-
shops, of impoverished schools and universities, of suffering fam-
ilies, of armies of unemployed—let these all join in hymns of hatred
toward internationalism and in paeans in honor of triumphant
nationalism. For nationalism is triumphant today, as are human
humiliation, human anxiety, and human misery.
No, internationalism has not failed. What has failed is contempo-
rary international statesmanship. It has failed because it has been
unable or unwilling to practice that form, and to engage in that
measure, of international cooperation which alone can save the
world from the all too devastating evils and the all too obvious
dangers of ruthless nationalism. What an internationalism too
timid, too exclusively verbal, and too unimaginatively national has
failed to give, we must demand of a bolder, wiser, and more gener-
ous conception of human relations. The League of Nations must go
forward, from the modest beginnings of a Covenant too considerate
of the traditions and prejudices of national sovereignty, toward the
goal of world federation. Let its shy friends become bolder and its
impatient critics more intelligent and more helpful. May our gen-
eration, which has already experienced miracles of destructive folly
on every hand, live to witness and to perform the miracle of con-
structive wisdom which will unite all the peoples of the world into
one living commonwealth of free nations!
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